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[693] 
Atlantic Marine and the Future of  
Forum Non Conveniens 
Robin Effron* 
This Article explores the impact of the Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion in Atlantic 
Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court on forum non conveniens doctrine. 
Although Atlantic Marine concerned a § 1404(a) transfer within the federal system, and 
therefore does not directly address forum-selection clauses pointing to foreign forums, 
the case will undoubtedly have an impact on how courts treat forum-selection clauses 
that point to a foreign forum. In this Article, I argue that the Atlantic Marine opinion 
relies on a strict coupling of § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens for its holding. As a 
result, lower courts will be more likely to conflate these two doctrines that had been 
slowly but surely developing on parallel tracks. This Article explains why merging or 
conflating § 1404(a) and the forum non conveniens doctrine is problematic, both as a 
general matter and as applied to the specific context of forum-selection clauses. It also 
demonstrates that the Court’s blunder is symptomatic of problems inherent in current 
interpretations and applications of the § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens doctrines. 
 
 * Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to Pamela Bookman, Trey Childress, David 
Marcus, Cassandra Burke Robertson, and Alan Trammell for comments on previous drafts, to Ka Ni 
Li for research assistance, and to Dean Nicholas Allard for support from the Dean’s Summer 
Research Fund. Thanks also to participants at the Hastings Law Journal Symposium, and participants 
at faculty workshops at Washington & Lee School of Law and St. John’s University School of Law. 
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Introduction 
The Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion in Atlantic Marine 
Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court1 is deceptively bland. Justice 
Alito’s opinion regarding the procedural niceties of federal venue has 
received little sustained attention, perhaps because it was hidden in a 
thicket of contentious and high-profile cases in the Court’s October 2013 
Term. Even within the community of civil procedure commentators, 
most scholars have focused their attention on the Court’s two newest 
personal jurisdiction decisions.2 This oversight is a mistake, and a 
peculiar one, because oversight and carelessness are the hallmarks of the 
Atlantic Marine opinion itself. Reflecting either sloppiness in research or 
vocabulary usage, the Atlantic Marine Court conflated the doctrines of 
§ 1404(a) transfer and forum non conveniens dismissal. This confusion 
exposes weaknesses in the current doctrines of § 1404(a), forum non 
conveniens, and enforcement of forum-selection clauses. It also 
endangers any efforts to strengthen and solidify the standards for 
§ 1404(a) transfer or forum non conveniens dismissal as distinct doctrines 
with unique considerations. 
Atlantic Marine resolved lower court disagreements over the proper 
procedural mechanism for federal court enforcement of forum-selection 
 
 1. 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013). 
 2. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). 
The Hastings Law Journal, along with Professors Dodson, Sachs, and Shannon, are to be commended for 
convening this symposium to draw much-needed scholarly attention to the Atlantic Marine opinion. 
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clauses. The case concerned a dispute over a construction contract between 
Atlantic Marine Construction, a Virginia construction contractor, and J-
Crew Management, Inc., a Texas subcontractor.3 The contract identified 
Virginia in its forum-selection clause.4 Following a dispute over payment, 
J-Crew filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Texas.5 Atlantic Marine, 
arguing that the forum-selection clause rendered Texas the “wrong” 
venue under § 1406(a), moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(3) for improper venue or, in the alternative, to transfer 
the case under to the Eastern District of Virginia under § 1404(a).6 The 
district court denied both motions.7 
The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which held that a 
forum-selection clause pointing to another federal forum does not render 
other federal venues “wrong” or “improper” within the meaning of 
§ 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3); thus, § 1404(a) is the appropriate procedural 
vehicle for enforcing forum-selection clauses that name a different federal 
forum.8 The Court then held that federal courts should enforce a forum-
selection clause “in all but the most exceptional cases,”9 and that when a 
court transfers a case as a result of a forum-selection clause, the choice-
of-law rules of the original forum will not apply in the transferee forum.10 
Although Atlantic Marine concerned a § 1404(a) transfer within the 
federal system, and therefore does not directly address forum non 
conveniens or enforcement of forum-selection clauses pointing to foreign 
forums, the case will undoubtedly have an impact on how courts treat 
both of these issues. In this Article, I argue that the Atlantic Marine 
opinion relies on a strict coupling of § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens 
for its holding. Although these doctrines had been slowly but surely 
developing on parallel tracks, courts have, on occasion, conflated the two 
doctrines. Such confusion rarely reflected a considered view of either 
procedural mechanism, but rather, mirrored underlying weaknesses in 
the standards that courts had developed for each doctrine. Far from 
helping to clarify either procedural mechanism, conflating the two doctrines 
leads only to a state of further confusion. When these two doctrines are 
merged for the purposes of enforcing forum-selection clauses, this 
conflation inflicts the harm of further solidifying a procedural mask behind 
which federal courts can hide a substantive common law of contracts. 
 
 3. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 575. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. at 576. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. at 575. 
 9. Id. at 581. 
 10. Id. at 582–83. 
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The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a short history 
of how Congress drew upon forum non conveniens in drafting § 1404(a) 
and how the result in Atlantic Marine hinges on this relationship. Part II 
argues that, despite their common origins, the standards for considering 
§ 1404(a) motions and forum non conveniens motions have not and 
should not be treated as identical or interchangeable standards. Part III 
examines the consequences of this argument in the specific context of 
enforcement of forum-selection clauses, with a particular focus on how 
the public interest consideration of choice of law can have different and 
unique consequences when the result of a forum-selection clause is 
dismissal and refiling in a foreign country. 
I.  ATLANTIC MARINE and the Inevitable Collision Between 
§ 1404(a) and Forum Non Conveniens 
The Atlantic Marine opinion emphasized that when Congress 
drafted § 1404(a), the intent was to codify the existing doctrine of forum 
non conveniens for the subset of cases where transfer is sought within the 
federal system, typically cases in which one or many of the parties 
believe that a different judicial district would be a more convenient 
location for litigation.11 The substantive law of enforcing forum-selection 
clauses, as well as the procedural mechanisms for doing so, set § 1404(a) 
and forum non conveniens on a collision course that resulted in the 
Atlantic Marine decision. This Part traces the inevitability of the clash, 
and the reasons why it resulted in a (perhaps unwitting) rebinding of the 
§ 1404(a) and forum non conveniens standards in Atlantic Marine. This 
Part will argue that, although Congress drafted § 1404(a) to codify the 
older common law forum non conveniens doctrine, Justice Alito 
overstated the case for treating the two standards as interchangeable. 
Section 1404(a) and the modern forum non conveniens doctrine 
developed from common origins and along parallel paths, but the 
mechanisms have remained distinct.12 One might expect for this state of 
affairs to remain unchallenged, as both doctrines afford district judges a 
comfortable margin of judicial discretion to determine whether a case 
should be litigated in a different forum.13 Since both doctrines engage a 
 
 11. Id. at 580 (“Section 1404(a) is merely a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
for the subset of cases in which the transferee forum is within the federal court system . . . .”). In many 
cases, venue will be proper in several judicial districts. Moreover, although transfer motions are usually made 
by a party to the litigation, judges have the power to initiate transfers on their own.  
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. For an overview of forum non conveniens see, for example, Donald Earl Childress, III, 
Rethinking Legal Globalization: The Case of Transnational Personal Jurisdiction, 54 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 1489, 1528–36 (2013); Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-
Access Doctrine, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 781 (1985); Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, 
Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1444, 1452–
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trial judge’s discretion to make a context-specific decision under a 
general standard to achieve (roughly) the same result, there were few 
reasons for litigants or other players in the judicial system to demand a 
unified standard or mechanism. 
The use and regulation of forum-selection clauses evolved alongside 
the development of § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens. The procedural 
story of forum-selection clauses unfolded during roughly the same time 
period as the development of the § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens 
doctrines. The history of forum-selection clauses and their enforceability 
has been ably documented by prominent scholars who have documented 
the difficulties that courts have deciding whether and how forum-
selection clauses should be enforced.14 Part of the problem lies in the 
precarious status of forum-selection clauses as an issue at the intersection 
of substantive and procedural law. When a court enforces a forum-selection 
clause, it is choosing to enforce a contract. Contract law governs the 
formation, validity, interpretation, and enforceability of the terms to an 
agreement, and forum-selection clauses are usually but one of many 
terms in a contract.15 On the other hand, the determination of venue for 
a lawsuit is a classic question of procedure, and the rules that govern 
venue generally are typically found in procedural codes.16 The fact that 
forum-selection clauses straddle the boundary of substance and 
procedure has made them a flashpoint for controversy. 
State courts tended to treat the matter as one of substantive contract 
law, with many states developing doctrines that disfavored the enforcement 
of forum-selection clauses on the grounds that they improperly ousted 
the court of its jurisdiction,17 or that enforcing such clauses was otherwise 
 
60 (2011). Scholarly treatment of § 1404(a) in its own right has been less robust, and the best primer is 
found in 15 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3841 (4th ed. 2013). 
 14. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After 
Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 55 (1992); David Marcus, 
The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal 
Courts, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 973 (2008); Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the 
Privatization of Procedure, 25 Cornell Int’l L.J. 51 (1992); Leandra Lederman, Note, Viva Zapata!: 
Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 422 (1991).  
 15. Marcus, supra note 14, at 980; Lederman, supra note 14, at 450–58; see also Linda S. Mullenix, 
Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction, 
27 Texas Int’l L.J. 323, 353–58 (1992) (explaining the relationship of forum-selection clauses to 
unconscionability doctrine). 
 16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012) (federal venue statute). State venue provisions are also codified. 
See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 503 (McKinney 2015) (New York general venue statute); Cal. Civ. Proc. 
Code §§ 392–403 (West 2015) (California venue statutes). 
 17. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 995–96 (summarizing ouster cases); David H. Taylor, The 
Forum Selection Clause: A Tale of Two Concepts, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 785, 793–99 (1993) (describing the 
rise and fall of ouster doctrine). 
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contrary to public policy.18 Additionally, some state legislatures have 
promulgated codified law addressing forum-selection clauses, banning 
them in specific contexts.19 One quirk of Atlantic Marine is that Texas 
has just such a law, which states that forum-selection clauses in 
construction contracts are voidable at the contractor’s option.20 The 
district court held that this statute did not apply to the Atlantic Marine 
contract because it called for construction on federal property.21 But 
what is notable is that the trial court considered that state law basis for 
enforcement at all. Perhaps it is the case that, under Texas law, other 
subcontractors would fall within the meaning of this statute, but the 
Atlantic Marine Court’s firm imposition of a presumption of 
enforceability appears to deter this inquiry for actions brought in federal 
court.22 
The federal government did not promulgate any codified law 
regarding the enforceability of forum-selection clauses. Some federal 
statutes, however, do have specific venue provisions that have been 
construed to override forum-selection clauses. In yet another Atlantic 
Marine twist, one such statute is the Miller Act, which governs federal 
construction contracts.23 J-Crew had initially brought a Miller Act 
claim,24 but dropped that cause of action before the case reached the 
Supreme Court.25 These federal statutory exceptions are few, and most 
cases fall under the Supreme Court’s common law formulation that forum-
selection clauses are, absent fraud or obvious overreaching, presumptively 
enforceable as a matter of federal admiralty and maritime law.26 
 
 18. Michael Mousa Karayanni, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Forum Selection 
Clauses, 34 Duq. L. Rev. 1009, 1015–32 (1996); see Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Validity of 
Contractual Provision Limiting Place or Court in Which Action May Be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4th 404 § 3 
(2015) (annotations of cases holding forum-selection clauses void on the grounds of public policy). 
 19. For example, many states restrict the use of forum-selection clauses in construction contracts. 
See Are Your Construction Contracts’ Forum-Selection and Choice-of-Law Clauses Enforceable?, Jones 
Day (June 2014), http://www.jonesday.com/Are-Your-Construction-Contracts-Forum-Selection-and-Choice-
of-Law-Clauses-Enforceable-06-18-2014/?RSS=true (summarizing state laws). For other compilations of 
state statutory and case law prohibiting or limiting the enforcement of forum-selection clauses, see 31 A.L.R. 
4th 404 § 3, § 4 (2015). 
 20. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 272.001 (West 2014). 
 21. J-Crew Mgmt., Inc. v. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., No. 12-228, 2012 WL 8499879, at *3 (W.D. 
Tex. Aug. 6, 2012). 
 22. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Gaming the System: Protecting Consumers from 
Unconscionable Contractual Forum-Selection and Arbitration Clauses, 66 Hastings L.J. 719 
(questioning footnote 5 of Atlantic Marine that presupposed the validity of the contract). 
 23. 40 U.S.C. §§ 3131–3134 (2012). See Marcus, supra note 14, at 1011 (summarizing Miller Act cases). 
 24. Complaint at 3, United States ex rel. J-Crew Mgmt., Inc. v. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., No. A-
12-CV-228-LY, 2012 WL 8499879 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2012). 
 25. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal at 1, J-Crew Mgmt., 2012 WL 8499879 (No. A-12-CV-228-LY). 
 26. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore 
Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
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Federal courts hearing state law cases under diversity jurisdiction 
also confronted the questions of validity and the enforcement mechanism 
inherent to forum-selection clauses. This brought the gap between 
federal and state treatment of forum-selection clauses into sharp relief. 
Because a federal court sitting in diversity must apply state substantive 
law and not federal common law,27 the state contract doctrines regarding 
the enforceability of forum-selection clauses would seem to control. 
However, since 1965, the Supreme Court has held that in a direct conflict 
between state law and codified federal procedural law, federal law 
governs in diversity cases.28 In Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,29 
the Court treated the enforceability of a forum-selection clause as a 
problem governed by the request for a § 1404(a) transfer, thus enabling 
the Court to hold that the federal venue transfer governed the case, and 
that the standard under § 1404(a) embodied the enforcement of forum-
selection clauses.30 
Stewart thus drove a wedge between the many states that refused to 
enforce forum-selection clauses and state law cases litigated in federal 
court where such clauses would be enforced, although most states have 
adopted the federal position either in whole or in part in the years since 
the Stewart decision.31 But Stewart also created a curious inconsistency 
regarding enforcement of forum-selection clauses within federal law. The 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute 
gave the federal courts a substantive standard that all “reasonable” forum-
selection clauses should be enforced, but Stewart designated § 1404(a) as 
a procedural mechanism—a rule in which the forum-selection clause was 
but one of several factors in a broad discretionary standard.32 As the 
authors of Wright and Miller observed: 
Put bluntly, the mere existence of the forum-selection clause is more 
powerful under M/S Bremen and Carnival Cruise than it is under 
Stewart. Under the former, it is presumptively valid and the resisting 
party has a heavy burden to overcome it. Under the latter, the clause is 
simply one (albeit an important one) of a mélange of factors to be 
assessed in ruling on a Section 1404(a) transfer.33 
 
 27. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938). 
 28. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965). 
 29. 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
 30. Id. at 30–32. For a detailed scholarly debate about the Erie dimensions of enforcing forum-
selection clauses in diversity cases, see generally Stanley E. Cox, et al., Case One: Choice of Forum 
Clauses, 29 New Eng. L. Rev. 517 (1995). 
 31. Michael D. Moberly & Carolyn F. Burr, Enforcing Forum Selection Clauses in State Court, 
39 Sw. L. Rev. 265 (2009). 
 32. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29 (“A motion to transfer under § 1404(a) thus calls on the district court 
to weigh in the balance a number of case-specific factors.”). 
 33. 14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3803.1 (4th ed. 
2013). For a contrary view, see Marcus, supra note 14, at 1015–32. 
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In sum, prior to Atlantic Marine, the federal government developed 
only a common law of forum-selection clause enforceability, and never 
promulgated an independent and codified mechanism or coherent doctrine 
for enforcing forum-selection clauses.34 As a matter of federal 
substantive law, enforceability remained a judicially created common law 
doctrine. As a matter of procedural law, the Court tied an arguably 
substantive contract law doctrine to § 1404(a) because of the need to 
utilize a codified federal statute to overcome an Erie problem. Under 
Hanna v. Plumer,35 a federal court will apply a valid federal directive (a 
codified procedural rule in a federal statute or federal rule of civil or 
appellate procedure) if it is broad enough to cover the particular 
procedural situation.36 This rule does not require a court to engage in the 
more complex balancing analysis of an “unguided Erie” choice. This is 
what made § 1404(a) an appealing choice for enforcing a forum-selection 
clause; so long as the Court gave a broad reading to the statute as one 
that covered everything about transferring venue,37 the Court gave trial 
courts an easy tool for enforcing forum-selection clauses, even in the face 
of a contrary state rule. But § 1404(a) is not necessarily the best fit for 
this purpose—it just happened to be the most relevant codified federal 
law. One could imagine a world in which the federal government, either 
through statute or a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, promulgated a rule 
that directly addressed both the standard and mechanism for enforcing 
forum-selection clauses in all cases litigated in federal court.38 
The patchwork of substantive and procedural doctrines governing 
the enforceability of forum-selection clauses left courts with lacunae for 
the enforceability of forum-selection clauses. Any clause pointing to a 
nonfederal forum could not be enforced using a § 1404(a) transfer to 
another federal judicial district. Thus, courts would need to find another 
codified federal procedural device to enforce the clause without causing 
an Erie problem. 
 
 34. Looking at the disarray in the federal doctrines of forum-selection clause enforcement, at 
least one scholar has proposed a legislative solution. See Borchers, supra note 14, at 93–98. This, itself, 
could create Erie problems depending on the mechanisms (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or 
statute). Even a federal statute would need to withstand a constitutional challenge to its validity, but 
given the Supreme Court’s broadly permissive stance regarding federal laws with any sort of 
procedural angle, such a law would likely pass constitutional muster. See Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407–08 (2010). 
 35. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 36. Id. at 470. 
 37. This includes the consideration of forum-selection clauses. 
 38. A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure would need to be valid under the Rules Enabling Act, a 
standard that it would meet if it “really regulates procedure.” Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464 (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Both a statute and a federal rule would almost certainly 
be constitutional, as a rule governing enforcement of forum-selection clauses is at least “rationally 
capable” of being classified as procedural. See id. at 471. 
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This gap left courts with the option of transferring or dismissing a 
case under § 1406(a) or dismissing the case on a Rule 12(b)(3) motion for 
improper venue. But this, too, was problematic because both § 1406(a) 
and Rule 12(b)(3) are mechanisms for remediating an improper venue.39 
Some lower federal courts had, nonetheless, used § 1406(a) and Rule 
12(b)(3) to enforce forum-selection clauses, even when the initial district 
was a proper venue within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the general 
venue provision for federal courts.40 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in Atlantic Marine, in part, to rectify this circuit split. The Court began 
its opinion by holding that, in cases where the district court would 
otherwise be a proper venue under § 1391, a court must use § 1404(a) to 
enforce a forum-selection clause that points to another federal forum.41 
The Court rejected the argument “that § 1404(a) is not a suitable 
mechanism to enforce forum-selection clauses because that provision 
cannot provide for transfer when a forum-selection clause specifies a 
state or foreign tribunal,”42 and held that “the appropriate way to 
enforce a forum-selection clause pointing to a state or foreign forum is 
through the doctrine of forum non conveniens.”43 In Part III of the 
opinion, the Court resolved the apparent conflict between the 
Bremen/Carnival Cruise doctrinal mandate and the Stewart procedural 
mechanism by holding that, under the § 1404(a) balancing standard, the 
existence of “a valid forum-selection clause [should be] given controlling 
weight in all but the most exceptional cases.”44 
The Atlantic Marine opinion emphasized that when Congress drafted 
§ 1404(a), the intent was to codify the existing doctrine of forum non 
conveniens for the subset of cases where transfer is sought within the 
federal system.45 Justice Alito leant heavily on this relationship, at times 
implying that the two standards are interchangeable. This is because the 
Court, having persuasively argued that § 1406(a) and Rule 12(b)(3) should 
not be used to enforce forum-selection clauses when venue is otherwise 
proper under § 1391, needed to emphasize this equivalence in order to 
justify using § 1404(a) as the exclusive mechanism for enforcing forum-
 
 39. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) (motion to dismiss for “improper venue”); 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2012) 
(“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district 
shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it 
could have been brought.”). 
 40. See Matthew J. Sorensen, Note, Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal Court 
After Atlantic Marine, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2521, 2539–40 (2014) (describing pre-Atlantic Marine circuit 
splits). 
 41. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 577–80 (2013). 
 42. Id. at 579. 
 43. Id. at 580. 
 44. Id. at 581 (quoting Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (Kennedy, J. 
concurring)). 
 45. Id. at 580. 
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selection clauses that point to a federal forum. With § 1406(a) and Rule 
12(b)(3) unavailable when venue is otherwise proper, and § 1404(a) 
unavailable when a forum-selection clause points to a foreign or nonfederal 
forum, the only procedural option for enforcing foreign and nonfederal 
forum-selection clauses is through forum non conveniens. And to avoid the 
implication that forum-selection clauses pointing to nonfederal or foreign 
forums would be evaluated under a different standard than those pointing 
to a federal forum, the Court stressed the harmony between the two 
standards. 
This line of reasoning necessitated rhetoric that minimizes distinctions 
between § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens. Justice Alito wrote that 
“[s]ection 1404(a) is merely a codification of the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens,”46 which reduced the differences between the doctrines by 
simply “replac[ing] the traditional remedy of outright dismissal with 
transfer.”47 Rather than recognizing forum non conveniens as an 
independent doctrine, Justice Alito characterized it as a “residual 
doctrine.”48 Lest the reader remain unconvinced that the Court has 
collapsed the distinction between § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens, 
Justice Alito concluded this part of the opinion by announcing that, 
“both § 1404(a) and the forum non conveniens doctrine from which it 
derives entail the same balancing-of-interests standard.”49 Justice Alito 
elaborated on this supposedly joint standard by noting that “a district 
court considering a § 1404(a) motion (or a forum non conveniens motion) 
must evaluate both the convenience of the parties and various public-
interest considerations.”50 While one could read this statement charitably 
as a general characterization of two standards, Justice Alito betrayed his 
bias by using a single footnote, in which a forum non conveniens case and 
a § 1404(a) work in tandem, to illustrate a single standard.51 
II.  The Uneasy Relationship Between § 1404(a) and  
Forum Non Conveniens 
The Atlantic Marine opinion relies in part on the idea that § 1404(a) 
and forum non conveniens decisions are made using roughly the same 
standard. The conclusion that the two doctrines are more or less 
interchangeable no doubt aided in the Court’s mission to reconcile the 
enforcement gap left by the existing codified venue mechanisms of 
§ 1404(a), § 1406(a), and Rule 12(b)(3). However, it also overstated the 
equivalence between these two doctrines. This equivalence is inconsistent 
 
 46. Id. at 580 (emphasis added). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. at 581. 
 51. Id. at 581 n.6. 
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with existing Supreme Court and lower court opinions that address 
§ 1404(a) and forum non conveniens. Furthermore, there are good policy 
reasons for affirming that § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens are parallel 
but distinct doctrines. 
A. Section 1404(a) and Forum Non Conveniens: Common Origins 
and Subsequent Divergence 
As the doctrines stand today, the standards for a § 1404(a) transfer and 
a forum non conveniens dismissal share similarities, but they are distinct 
doctrines. The standard for transfer under § 1404(a) gives district judges the 
discretion to consider whether to transfer a case “[f]or the convenience 
of parties and witnesses” and “in the interest of justice.”52 By contrast, a 
court entertaining a forum non conveniens dismissal motion must consider 
a list of factors with both public and private dimensions.53 The private 
factors include, 
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of 
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of 
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of 
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other 
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and 
inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforceability of a 
judgment if one is obtained.54 
The public factors include: 
Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up 
in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is 
a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a 
community which has no relation to the litigation. . . . There is a local 
interest in having localized controversies decided at home. There is an 
appropriateness, too, in having the trial . . . in a forum that is at home 
with the . . . law that must govern the case, rather than having a court 
in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law 
foreign to itself.55 
District court decisions of both doctrines are reviewed on an abuse of 
discretion standard,56 although most courts and commentators agree that 
judges have greater discretion under § 1404(a) than under forum non 
conveniens.57 Although both standards are concerned with ideas of 
 
 52. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). 
 53. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 
U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947)). 
 54. Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508. 
 55. Id. at 508–09. 
 56. See, e.g., A. Olinick & Sons v. Dempster Bros., Inc., 365 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1966) (§ 1404(a) 
transfers reviewed for abuse of discretion); Lockman Found. v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 
764, 767 (9th Cir. 1991) (forum non conveniens dismissals reviewed for abuse of discretion). 
 57. See infra notes 90–96 and accompanying text. 
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convenience and economy, the forum non conveniens inquiry encompasses 
broader policy interests. 
Federal district judges did not always have the power to transfer 
cases to another judicial district. Prior to the enactment of § 1404(a) in 
1948, judges had only the doctrine of forum non conveniens at their 
disposal, and federal forum non conveniens was itself a relatively new 
phenomenon,58 having emerged from an amalgam of admiralty and state 
law doctrines.59 Whether the preferred alternative forum was a foreign 
country, a U.S. state court, or another federal judicial district, the process 
was the same: dismiss the case for forum non conveniens and assume that 
the parties would file a new case in a different court. Dismissal and filing 
anew was “a cumbersome and wasteful process.”60 The advent of liberal 
venue provisions for federal courts also cluttered the process. In many 
cases, a number of federal districts would be a proper venue within the 
meaning of the federal venue statute,61 thus creating the possibility that 
plaintiffs might choose a forum that, while proper, was inconvenient and 
burdensome. There was thus a need for a mechanism within the federal 
system that could sort the better or even optimal venues from the larger 
pool of proper venues. To address these issues, Congress passed § 1404(a), 
which allows the direct transfer of cases from one proper federal judicial 
district to another. 
Because § 1404(a) emerged from the context of, and as a complement 
to, forum non conveniens, courts had to determine whether § 1404(a) 
should be interpreted as codifying the forum non conveniens standard. 
The Supreme Court initially looked favorably upon this position,62 citing 
legislative history that “made obvious that § 1404(a) at least partially 
codified forum non conveniens.”63 This is because § 1404(a) allows federal 
district judges to capture the purpose and equities of forum non conveniens 
while streamlining the process for transfers within the federal system.64 
Therefore, it made some sense to conceptualize § 1404(a) as merely a 
new instrument for implementing the existing forum non conveniens 
standard. However, even this origin story might have been just that—a 
 
 58. See Stein, supra note 13, at 801 (“the doctrine of forum non conveniens was virtually unheard 
of, outside of the admiralty context, prior to 1929”). 
 59. See id. at 811 (describing how a 1929 law review article collected cases and doctrines to state a 
theory of forum non conveniens that was then adopted by the Supreme Court). 
 60. 15 Wright et al., supra note 13, § 3841. 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012). 
 62. Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 58 (1948) (quoting the § 1404(a) Reviser’s Note, which stated 
that § 1404(a) “was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens”). Reviser’s 
Note, H.R. Rep. No. 80-308, at A132 (1947). 
 63. Marcus, supra note 14, at 1010. 
 64. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (“[T]he purpose of [§ 1404(a)] is to prevent 
the waste ‘of time, energy and money’ and ‘to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary 
inconvenience and expense.’” (quoting Continental Grain Co. v. Barge, 364 U.S. 19, 26, 27 (1960))). 
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story. Professor Allan Stein, who documented the origins and development 
of the forum non conveniens doctrine in meticulous detail,65 argued 
persuasively that the annotations to § 1404(a) that “refer to it as a 
codification of the forum non conveniens doctrine” are a “creative bit of 
retroactive legislative history” because the text of § 1404(a) was actually 
drafted several years before the Supreme Court articulated the forum 
non conveniens doctrine in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.66 
In any case, the Supreme Court backed away from the codification 
view less than a decade later, explaining in Norwood v. Kirkpatrick that 
forum non conveniens is “quite different from Section 1404(a). . . . The 
notion that 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) was a mere codification of existing law 
relating to forum non conveniens is erroneous.”67 The Court solidified 
this view in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, the seminal forum non 
conveniens case of modern times, stating that the standards in § 1404(a) 
and forum non conveniens, while similar, are not the same.68 The Court 
stressed that § 1404(a) “was intended to be a revision rather than a 
codification of the common law.”69 
Lower courts have also stressed the doctrinal distinction between 
§ 1404(a) and forum non conveniens. For example, the Ninth Circuit has 
held that, unlike a “mere transfer of venue, [forum non conveniens] . . . is 
an ‘exceptional tool to be employed sparingly,’ and not a ‘doctrine that 
compels plaintiffs to choose the optimal forum for their claim.’”70 
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit observed that “section 1404(a) intended to 
revise . . . the common law.”71 Several decisions from other circuit and 
district courts around the country echo these refrains.72 
The Wright & Miller treatise, noting the common origins and 
superficial similarities of the two doctrines, offers this word of caution: 
 
 
[I]t is preferable that the term “forum non conveniens” not be 
employed in discussing motions to transfer. The danger in conflating 
language is that it might cause conflation of the two very different 
doctrines. Although forum non conveniens analysis informs the 
 
 65. See generally Stein, supra note 13. 
 66. See id. at 807. 
 67. 349 U.S. 29, 31 (1955) (quoting Jiffy Lubricator Co., Inc. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 
360, 362 (4th Cir. 1949)). 
 68. 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1224 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dole 
Food Co., v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 71. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bartile Roofs, Inc., 618 F.3d 1153, 1168 n.13 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(emphasis added). 
 72. Wright & Miller have an excellent collection of these cases in their annotation. See 
14D Wright et al., supra note 33, § 3828 n.10. 
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interpretation of the statutory transfer provision, the two are not 
equivalent and should not be confused.73 
Despite these seemingly unequivocal statements from both courts and 
commentators differentiating § 1404(a) from forum non conveniens, 
from time to time some lower courts have conflated the two doctrines.74 
Even the Supreme Court has made the occasional stray comment 
suggesting the equivalency of § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens. In 
the 2007 Sinochem International Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia International 
Shipping Corp. decision, Justice Ginsburg delivered the following rather 
ambiguous statement concerning the relationship of the two doctrines: 
“Congress has codified the doctrine [of forum non conveniens] and has 
provided for transfer, rather than dismissal, when a sister federal court is 
the more convenient place for trial of the action.”75 Almost certainly, the 
Sinochem Court did not mean for this statement to signal a reversal (or 
even a shift) in the Norwood/Piper doctrine that § 1404(a) is not a 
codification of forum non conveniens.76 Yet one can still see this as a 
harbinger of things to come in Atlantic Marine. When distracted by other 
topics, (Sinochem was primarily concerned with the complicated issue of 
jurisdictional sequencing77) the Court is just as likely as the occasional 
errant district court to conflate § 1404(a) with forum non conveniens. 
Atlantic Marine provided another such distraction. The issue of forum-
selection clauses and their (supposedly) identical enforcement outcomes 
under any test distracted the Court from keeping the doctrines of 
§ 1404(a) and forum non conveniens separate. The problem is that, in a 
case like Atlantic Marine, this conflation is more than a minor slip. In 
Atlantic Marine, this conflation was the logical result of how the Court 
chose to interpret the scope of § 1404(a), § 1406(a), and Rule 12(b)(3). 
Given the overall trajectory of lower court and Supreme Court 
precedent in § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens cases, it is doubtful 
that the Court intended to use Atlantic Marine as an occasion to merge 
the § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens doctrines. Unfortunately, Justice 
Alito’s language provides a fairly strong basis for making this exact 
claim.78 
 
 73. Id. § 3828. 
 74. See id. at n.12 (listing eight district court cases in which a court analyzed a § 1404(a) transfer motion 
under the forum non conveniens standard); see also Paradis v. Dooley, 774 F. Supp. 79, 82 (D.R.I. 1991). 
 75. Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 76. One could even understand this sentence to mean that § 1404(a) is a codification of transfer 
itself, and not of forum non conveniens, although this is a rather strained reading. 
 77. See Alan M. Trammell, Jurisdictional Sequencing, 47 Ga. L. Rev. 1099, 1109–10 (2013) 
(arguing that Sinochem concerned jurisdictional sequencing and characterized forum non conveniens 
at a nonmerits threshold issue). 
 78. See supra notes 28–36 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Problems with Merging Doctrines 
Justice Alito’s implication that § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens 
share a common standard misreads the previous case law. It is also 
wrongheaded as a matter of policy. There are good reasons to keep each 
standard in its separate (if still parallel) sphere. 
The Atlantic Marine case itself was about enforcement of forum-
selection clauses, a topic which might have misled the Court to conclude 
that § 1404(a) and the doctrine of forum non conveniens were 
interchangeable. This idea, however, is far from obvious, even as regards 
forum-selection clauses. Both § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens govern 
a far wider array of matters beyond forum-selection clause enforcement. 
It is quite possible that the Court did not mean to introduce a broad and 
far-reaching equation of the two doctrines, effectively instructing district 
courts to use the same inquiry for both § 1404(a) cases and forum non 
conveniens cases. But, equate the two doctrines they did, and it is worth 
noting the general reasons why this is problematic. 
Treating § 1404(a) transfers as a subset of forum non conveniens or 
a mere codification of the common law doctrine glosses over the very 
real differences between these two mechanisms. These differences stem 
from one key characteristic, namely, that forum non conveniens results in 
a dismissal79 and a full exit from the federal court system, whereas a 
§ 1404(a) transfer quite literally changes only the venue. 
This means that disposition of a § 1404(a) motion carries with it a 
fairly high degree of certainty as to how the case will proceed. For one thing, 
the parties can be assured that the case will continue apace, regardless of 
what venue it is litigated in, even if only to end shortly thereafter on a 
motion to dismiss.80 A forum non conveniens dismissal carries with it no 
such assurances. Although the forum non conveniens doctrine conditions 
dismissal on the existence of an “adequate alternative forum,”81 the 
action must be brought anew by the parties in the new forum. 
The costs of restarting the action, both real and psychological, are 
likely higher than those associated with continuing to litigate an existing 
case in a different forum within the same judicial system. There is no 
guarantee that the case would not settle or languish in the new forum 
because of differences in the procedural and/or substantive law of the 
 
 79. Other provisional remedies for forum non conveniens are discussed below, but even those 
remedies support the distinction between § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens. 
 80. That is, of course, unless the transferee court is more receptive to a forum non conveniens motion 
than was the transferor court, as happened in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 242–44 (1981). 
 81. See Joel H. Samuels, When Is an Alternative Forum Available? Rethinking the Forum Non 
Conveniens Analysis, 85 Ind. L.J. 1059 (2010) (describing adequate alternative forum doctrine and 
proposing a six-part alternative to the current test). 
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jurisdiction from what they would have been in the original forum.82 
Even though the Supreme Court has held that such differences (even if 
substantial) do not amount to a deprivation of an “adequate alternative 
forum,”83 these differences can have a profound impact on the costs of 
litigation and the expected outcome of a case. This, in turn, changes the 
incentives of the parties with regards to settling, or even refiling the 
action at all.84 
Parties in a § 1404(a) transfer case, on the other hand, do not 
experience any changes in applicable law. The procedural law of the 
transferee forum will be largely the same—the codified and common law 
rules of federal civil procedure. Aside from differences among circuits or 
applications of local rules, parties can expect roughly the same procedures 
in the transferee forum.85 However, the transferee court in a § 1404(a) 
case must apply the substantive law of the transferor court.86 This result 
holds even when it would encourage flagrant forum shopping.87 
Interestingly, the Atlantic Marine Court made an exception to this rule 
with regard to transfers enforcing forum-selection clauses,88 which I 
discuss below.89  
For now, it is sufficient to note that, as a general matter, a forum 
non conveniens dismissal can have a much greater impact on the 
outcome of a case, both as to issues of liability and the quantum of 
recovery. Much scholarship, such as the Clermont and Eisenberg study 
that demonstrated that § 1404(a) transfers have can have a significant 
effect on case outcomes, acknowledges that forum non conveniens 
dismissals are a different world altogether.90 Not only are the choice-of-
law decisions of a foreign or state court apt to result in different 
 
 82. See Thomas Orin Main, Toward a Law of “Lovely Parting Gifts”: Conditioning Forum Non 
Conveniens Dismissals, 18 Sw. J. Int’l Law 475, 478 (2012) (“Defendants often have much to gain from a 
dismissal even though the action can be refiled in a foreign forum: delay can be useful to a defendant, the 
substantive or procedural law applied in the foreign forum may favor the defendant, the dismissal could 
lead the plaintiff to accept a modest settlement, or the plaintiff may abandon the claim altogether.”). 
 83. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254–55. 
 84. Moreover, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that factors such as statutes of limitations 
might cause the plaintiff “to lose out completely.” Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31 (1955). 
 85. This is not to minimize the effects of circuit splits or even the application of local rules. See Kevin 
M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum Shopping, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1507 
(1995) (empirical analysis finding a significant drop in the win rate for plaintiffs in transfer cases); see also 
Samuel P. Jordan, Local Rules and the Limits of Trans-Territorial Procedure, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 415 
(2010) (discussing proliferation of local rules and defending them on the grounds of transparency). 
However, these differences pale in comparison to the differences between different legal systems entirely. 
 86. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 642 (1964). 
 87. Ferens v. John Deere, 494 U.S. 516, 528–29 (1990). 
 88. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 583 (2013) (“[W]e will not apply 
the Van Dusen rule when a transfer stems from enforcement of a forum- selection clause.”). 
 89. See infra notes 133–34 and accompanying text. 
 90. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 85, at 1514 n.18 (citing study showing that plaintiffs 
generally do not win in foreign court following a forum non conveniens dismissal). 
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applicable law, but the ability to make these choices at all introduces an 
element of unpredictability into forum non conveniens dismissals that 
does not exist in the more stable world of § 1404(a) transfers. 
Beyond the fact that differences in applicable law produce divergent 
and unpredictable litigation outcomes, plaintiffs who are shunted to a 
foreign forum on a forum non conveniens motion are often thrust into 
the unpredictable realm of enforcing foreign judgments.91 In a few high-
profile cases in which, following a forum non conveniens dismissal, the 
plaintiffs have litigated successfully in a foreign forum, the same U.S. 
court that found the foreign forum to be an “adequate alternative” for 
purposes of forum non conveniens have subsequently refused to enforce 
the resulting foreign judgment based on deficiencies in the foreign 
proceedings.92 Litigants whose cases are transferred per § 1404(a) face no 
such enforcement gap.93 
Many federal judges have tried to impose some degree of 
predictability on forum non conveniens dismissals through the use of 
conditional dismissals, a practice by which courts extract an agreement 
from the parties about how the case will be litigated in the alternative 
forum.94 Typically, such conditions touch on the defendant’s consent to 
personal jurisdiction,95 waiver of statutes of limitations,96 or a host of 
other conditions meant to ease the burden on plaintiffs precluded from 
taking advantage of the permissive procedures of U.S. courts.97 Conditional 
dismissals also take away some of the bite of the “adequate alternative 
forum” doctrine, as the dismissing court more or less convinces itself that 
it has created or ensured a forum that is more than the bare-bones 
 
 91. See Michael Goldhaber, Forum Shopper’s Remorse, Corp. Counsel, Apr. 2010, at 63. 
 92. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 13, at 1472–81. 
 93. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2012) (registration of judgments for enforcement in other districts). Incidentally, 
this is also true of any case that would be dismissed on forum non conveniens and then litigated in a 
domestic state court. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (full faith and credit clause). However, forum non conveniens is 
used almost exclusively for cases where the alternative forum is outside of the United States, unless it 
is being used to enforce a forum-selection clause. 
 94. See Julius Jurianto, Forum Non Conveniens: Another Look at Conditional Dismissals, 83 U. Det. 
Mercy L. Rev. 369, 399–400 (2006); Main, supra note 82, at 578–85. 
 95. See, e.g., Banco De Seguros Del Estado v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 500 F. Supp. 2d 251, 266 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (conditioning dismissal on acceptance of personal jurisdiction and service of process 
in foreign forum); In re Alcon Shareholder Litig., 719 F. Supp. 2d 263, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (same). 
 96. See, e.g., LaSala v. UBS, AG, 510 F. Supp. 2d 213, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (conditioning dismissal on 
the defendant “appearing and defending on the merits, without interposing a statute of limitations”); 
In re Compania Naviera Joanna, 569 F.3d 189, 205 (4th Cir. 2009) (dismissal conditional on defendants 
agreeing not to raise statute of limitations defense in China). 
 97. Professor Main has compiled a comprehensive list of these conditions. Main, supra note 82, at 479–
80; see also John Bies, Note, Conditioning Forum Non Conveniens, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 489, 501–03 (2000). 
One such popular condition involves requiring the parties to participate in American-style discovery. Some 
appeals courts, however, have looked warily upon this condition and restricted its application. See In re 
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 809 F.2d 195, 205–06 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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“adequate alternative forum” required by Piper, but is instead something 
approaching an equivalent alternative forum.98 
The imposition of conditional dismissals, then, shows what odd 
companions § 1404(a) and the forum non conveniens doctrines really are. 
While courts right up through Atlantic Marine have meandered into the 
mistake of opining that § 1404(a) is a “mere codification” of forum non 
conveniens doctrine, it is actually the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
that judges have tried to hammer, somewhat awkwardly,99 into a form 
that mimics a § 1404(a) transfer. Try as they might, however, judges 
cannot use conditional dismissals to transform forum non conveniens 
dismissals into a de facto system of international transfer. Enforcing 
conditional dismissals “can be problematic.”100 Asking (not to mention 
ensuring) that a foreign court apply the substantive law of the original 
U.S. forum is nigh impossible. The Supreme Court itself recognized this 
fact in Piper when it refused to extend the Van Dusen choice-of-law 
reasoning to the forum non conveniens context.101 
Given how different the mechanisms of a § 1404(a) transfer and a 
forum non conveniens dismissal really are, it is no surprise that the 
standard for each doctrine is—and should remain—distinct. Under one 
common formulation, the § 1404(a) standard is different from forum non 
conveniens because it affords district judges more discretion.102 Although 
defining the meaning and boundaries of judicial discretion over 
procedural matters is notoriously difficult,103 the world of permissible 
transfer outcomes is broader than the world of permissible forum non 
conveniens dismissals.104 
The broad discretion to transfer pursuant § 1404(a) fits comfortably 
within the model of managerial judging that underlies many procedural 
 
 98. See Jurianto, supra note 94, at 400–01. Jurianto notes that courts have further softened this doctrine 
by conditioning the dismissal on the foreign court’s acceptance of jurisdiction. Id. at 401 nn.301–02. 
 99. See id. at 402 (characterizing the range of conditions imposed by lower courts as “incoherent”); 
Bies, supra note 97, at 490 (“[T]he pattern of conditions imposed by various district courts seems 
incoherent.”). Professor Main has criticized some of the conditions themselves as being “plagued with 
the pathogen of vagueness.” Main, supra note 82, at 488. Main has questioned whether courts even 
have the authority to enter such conditional dismissals at all. Id. at 491–98. 
 100. Main, supra note 82, at 479. 
 101. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981). 
 102. Id. at 265 (“District courts were given more discretion to transfer under § 1404(a) than they had to 
dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens.”); see also Amazon.com v. Cendant Corp., 404 F. Supp. 2d 
1256, 1259 (W.D. Wa. 2005); O’Brien v. Goldstar Technology, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 383, 385 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 103. Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural Law, 65 Ala. L. Rev. 683, 
695–98 (2014). 
 104. Because both doctrines are reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard, the practical reality 
is that neither standard is heavily policed by appellate courts. This does not mean, however, that any 
distinction between the two is erased by permissive standards of appellate review. 
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tools that judges have at their disposal.105 Because transferring a case 
within the federal system does not end the lawsuit or alter the applicable 
law, the decision to transfer looks more like the decisions about joining 
claims or parties, or questions regarding discovery. There is no question 
that the outcomes of such procedural choices can have profound effects 
on how cases are litigated and resolved.106 Nevertheless, these are tools 
that do not really change the rules of the game. More accurately, they 
alter how the game will be played within the common and roughly 
predictable framework of the federal court system. This is why the 
Supreme Court has described § 1404(a) as a “housekeeping measure.”107 
Forum non conveniens, on the other hand, cannot be so described, and 
discretion to dismiss under this doctrine is thus more limited. 
Section 1404(a) and forum non conveniens also differ in how they 
treat the idea of (in)convenience itself. Although both standards account 
for private and public interests, it is forum non conveniens that places 
convenience at the centerpiece of the inquiry,108 whereas the § 1404(a) 
inquiry is directed at ascertaining the “center of gravity” of the 
litigation,109 a “core determination under § 1404(a).”110 The party moving 
for a forum non conveniens dismissal has a higher burden of showing the 
inconvenience of continuing the litigation in the plaintiff’s chosen forum 
than a party moving for a § 1404(a) transfer.111 This is because the 
“‘heavy burden traditionally imposed upon defendants by the forum non 
conveniens doctrine—dismissal permitted only in favor of a substantially 
 
 105. See Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 
23 J. Legal Stud. 627 (1994); Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 
78 Wash. L. Rev. 429, 472–73 (2003); David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and 
Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1969 (1989); see also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 
96 Harv. L. Rev. 374 (1982) (identifying and critiquing the phenomenon of managerial judging).  
 106. I have documented such outcomes with regard to some of the rules of joinder. Robin J. 
Effron, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 Geo. L.J. 759 (2012). Clermont and Eisenberg have done 
the same for cases transferred under § 1404(a). Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 85. 
 107. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 526 (1990). 
 108. Coffey v. Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 220 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Less of a showing of 
inconvenience is needed for a § 1404(a) transfer than that for a forum non conveniens dismissal.”). 
Convenience, however, is not the exclusive area of inquiry in forum non conveniens. See Whytock & 
Robertson, supra note 13, at 1455 (focus on convenience is not “single-minded”). 
 109. See, e.g., Audi AG & Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. D’Amato, 341 F. Supp. 2d 734, 751 (E.D. 
Mich. 2004); Coker v. Bank of Am., 984 F. Supp. 757, 767–68 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Although “center of 
gravity” is used on occasion in connection with forum non conveniens, see, e.g., Isr. Disc. Bank, Ltd. v. 
Schapp, 505 F. Supp. 2d 651, 661–62 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Morrison Law Firm v. Clarion Co., Ltd., 158 
F.R.D. 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), it is not the touchstone of the inquiry, but rather, a proxy for the 
choice-of-law inquiry that might affect the public factors. See William L. Reynolds, The Proper Forum 
for a Suit: Transnational Forum Non Conveniens and Counter-Suit Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 
70 Tex. L. Rev. 1663, 1679–80 (1992). 
 110. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. Melvin Simon Prods., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 858, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 111. See In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 314 (5th Cir. 2008) (§ 1404(a) venue 
transfers may be granted “upon a lesser showing of inconvenience” than forum non conveniens 
dismissals). 
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more convenient alternative—was dropped in the § 1404(a) context.’”112 
Put another way, both § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens account for 
convenience, but in notably different ways. Section 1404(a)’s center of 
gravity inquiry focuses the attention of the court on the relative 
convenience of the transferee forum, whereas the forum non conveniens 
factors demand closer scrutiny of the inconvenience of the initial forum.113 
One final note about the general differences between § 1404(a) and 
forum non conveniens is in order before moving on to the specific 
context of forum-selection clauses. To say that each of these doctrines 
has (and should have) a distinct standard is emphatically not to say that 
the current standards and formulations of each doctrine are perfect. 
There is a long scholarly history of criticizing both of these doctrines as 
unpredictable, incoherent, and even inequitable.114 The fact that the 
doctrines may be so easily mistaken as interchangeable is more of a 
testament to poorly formulated and unevenly applied standards than it is 
a reflection on the purposes and use of each as its own procedural tool. 
III.  Section 1404(a), Forum Non Conveniens,  
and Forum-Selection Clauses 
Section 1404(a) and forum non conveniens are not identical 
mechanisms or doctrines. Although they do not share a single standard, 
the inquiry under each doctrine is somewhat similar in that they both 
direct judges to consider both private and public factors in deciding 
whether to transfer or dismiss a case brought in a forum where venue is 
otherwise proper.115 It is this congruity that led the Atlantic Marine 
Court to treat § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens as one. Perhaps, 
however, Justice Alito is to be forgiven for his statements to the contrary 
because the two doctrines really are interchangeable in one particular 
context: the enforcement of forum-selection clauses. 
In this Part, I argue that, even as applied to forum-selection clauses, 
the doctrines are not equivalent. Treating them as such says more about 
 
 112. Id. Note, however, the departure from the historical origins of forum non conveniens doctrine 
which “was not designed to assure trial in the most convenient location” and instead focused more on the 
public factor of respecting comity and the private factor of ensuring remedies. Stein, supra note 13, at 810. 
 113. Of course, both standards involve a comparison of the initial forum and the proposed new 
forum. The difference is one of emphasis and burden, not on an exclusive inquiry into one or the other. 
 114. See, e.g., Michael M. Karayanni, The Myth and Reality of a Controversy: “Public Factors” and 
the Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine, 21 Wis. Int’l L.J. 327, 330 (2003); David W. Robertson, The 
Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: “An Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion”, 29 Tex. 
Int’l L.J. 353, 359 (1994) (the forum non conveniens standard is “non-exhaustive, unweighted, and 
unranked”); Stein, supra note 13; Megan Waples, Note, The Adequate Alternative Forum Analysis in 
Forum Non Conveniens: A Case for Reform, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 1475 (2004). 
 115. See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30 (1988) (discussing the public and 
private interest factors in the § 1404(a) analysis); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) 
(discussing the public and private interest factors in the forum non conveniens analysis). 
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the Court’s faulty approach to enforcing forum-selection clauses than it 
does about any similarities between § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens. 
I consider this first in the context of the private factors and then in the 
context of the public factors. 
A. The Case of the Vanishing Private Interest Factors 
The district court in Atlantic Marine refused to transfer the case to 
Virginia, reasoning that “[a] balancing of the private-interest factors 
relevant to this case militates against a transfer to Virginia.”116 The Supreme 
Court rejected this application of the § 1404(a) balancing test, holding 
instead that this inquiry is all but unnecessary in forum-selection clause 
enforcement, acknowledging that “[o]rdinarily, the district court would 
weigh the relevant factors and decide whether, on balance, a transfer 
would serve ‘the convenience of parties and witnesses’ and otherwise 
promote ‘the interest of justice.’”117 A valid forum-selection clause, 
however, transforms this balancing act quite dramatically by effectively 
removing all other private interest factors: “[A] court evaluating a 
defendant’s § 1404(a) motion to transfer based on a forum-selection 
clause should not consider arguments about the parties’ private 
interests.”118 Leaving nothing to chance, Justice Alito immediately 
reiterated this point with the statement, “[a] court accordingly must 
deem the private-interest factors to weigh entirely in favor of the 
preselected forum.”119 
This conclusion was driven by an interpretation of the text of 
§ 1404(a), which states that a transfer should account for the “interest of 
justice.” According to the Court, the enforcement of a forum-selection 
clause is so paramount that it crowds out any other possible interests. 
“The ‘enforcement of valid forum-selection clauses, bargained for by the 
parties, protects their legitimate expectations and furthers vital interests 
of the justice system.’”120 The Court thus transformed forum-selection 
clause enforcement—undoubtedly an interest of justice—into the only 
private interest cognizable under the § 1404(a) standard. The Court also 
conveniently did away with convenience. Although the text of § 1404(a) 
reads “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of 
justice,” Justice Alito announced that “the interest of justice” is the 
“overarching consideration under § 1404(a).” He provided no further 
 
 116. J-Crew Mgmt., Inc. v. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., No. 12-228, 2012 WL 8499879, at *6 (W.D. 
Tex. Aug. 6, 2012). 
 117. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a) (2006)). 
 118. Id. at 582. 
 119. Id. (emphasis added). 
 120. Id. 
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insight as to why such a parsing of the language is the best or even a 
plausible reading of § 1404(a). 
 Recall that, after the medley of Bremen, Carnival Cruise, and 
Stewart, many courts and commentators observed that Stewart actually 
softened the doctrine of forum-selection clause enforcement by tying it 
to the discretionary balancing test of § 1404(a).121 Thus, although the 
Court defended this reading of § 1404(a) by repeatedly citing Stewart, its 
conclusion about the force of forum-selection clauses is an overstatement, if 
not an outright misrepresentation, of Stewart’s holding that “[t]he forum-
selection clause . . . should receive neither dispositive consideration nor 
no consideration.”122 
The Stewart decision did emphasize that a forum-selection clause 
would be a “significant” factor in § 1404(a) analysis, but only after 
stressing that “[s]ection 1404(a) is intended to place discretion into the 
district court . . . according to an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration 
of convenience and fairness.’”123 Justice Marshall explicitly considered 
that it was “conceivable in a particular case . . . that because of these factors 
a district court acting under § 1404(a) would refuse to transfer a case 
notwithstanding the counterweight of a forum-selection clause.”124 This 
delegation of discretion is part of what supports the Stewart Court’s Erie 
conclusion. Justice Marshall’s language bears repeating in full: 
Congress has directed that multiple considerations govern transfer 
within the federal court system, and a state policy focusing on a single 
concern or subset of factors identified in § 1404(a) would defeat that 
command. Its application would impoverish the flexible and 
multifaceted analysis that Congress intended to govern motions to 
transfer within the federal system.125 
Therefore, it is far from a foregone conclusion that Stewart (and thus 
federal law) mandates nearly unequivocal enforcement of forum-selection 
clauses. 
What does all of this mean, then, for the continued viability of the 
private interest factors in forum non conveniens motions to enforce 
forum-selection clauses? As I have argued above, the Atlantic Marine 
Court tied the use of § 1404(a) as an enforcement mechanism to the 
existence of forum non conveniens as an equivalent and viable alternative 
for clauses that point to a foreign or nonfederal forum. Given the Court’s 
insistence that, for purposes of § 1404(a), forum-selection clauses 
swallow all other private interests whole, it would be surprising if the 
Court tolerated a more permissive standard for forum non conveniens. 
 
 121. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
 122. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988). 
 123. Id. at 29 (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). 
 124. Id. at 30–31. 
 125. Id. at 31 (emphasis added). 
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The Atlantic Marine Court made it plain that any test that accounts for 
private interests beyond the forum-selection clause itself is reversible for 
abuse of discretion. Thus, beyond conflating the two doctrines as it did in 
the general transfer and dismissal context, the application of these 
doctrines to forum-selection clause enforcement seems to obliterate 
them altogether. 
B. Whither the Public Interest Factors? 
The Atlantic Marine Court eliminated the private interest factors 
for use in forum-selection clause enforcement, but perhaps it is too soon 
to conclude that it eradicated § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens 
altogether. After all, Justice Alito did create a small amount of 
negotiating room by directing district courts to give a forum-selection 
clause “‘controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases.’”126 
Since the Court expressly forbade courts from considering the private 
interest factors, it is presumably a public interest factor that would 
constitute one of these “extraordinary circumstances.”127 And the Court 
is exceptionally clear in providing no guidance as to what an “exceptional 
circumstance” might be.128 
Although the Gulf Oil factors and similar public interest factors 
cited in § 1404(a) cases are not meant to be an exclusive or exhaustive 
list,129 the public factors generally coalesce around considerations of 
whether a case would clog the docket or burden the resources of a 
jurisdiction with little connection to the case, and the relative interests of 
the two forums, especially concerning problems that arise when a court 
must apply difficult and unfamiliar law.130 As it turns out, Atlantic 
Marine also ensures that the choice-of-law consideration is unavailable 
as a public interest factor. 
The Court used Atlantic Marine as an occasion to carve out an 
exception to the Van Dusen rule that the transferee court must apply the 
choice-of-law rules of the transferor court.131 It held that “when a party 
bound by a forum-selection clause flouts its contractual obligation and 
files suit in different forum, a § 1404(a) transfer of venue will not carry 
with it the original venue’s choice-of-law rules.”132 Thus, there is no need 
 
 126. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 579 (2013) (quoting Stewart, 487 
U.S. at 33). 
 127. Id. at 575. 
 128. See Mullenix, supra note 22, at 727–29. 
 129. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (list of forum non conveniens factors is 
nonexhaustive); Powell v. I-Flow Corp., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1015 (D. Minn. 2010) (list of § 1404(a) 
factors is nonexhaustive). 
 130. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 131. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964). 
 132. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582. 
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for the transferor court to concern itself with problems that the 
transferee court might have in applying choice-of-law rules, because the 
transferee court will never have to leave the comfort of the choice-of-law 
rules of the state in which it sits. 
Just like that, a major component of the public interest factors 
analysis has disappeared. All that is left are the worries about 
administrative costs and burdens to the public, and because these factors 
often concern the interests of the transferor court, only a small number 
of situations remain in which the district court is permitted to consider, 
as an “extraordinary circumstance,” the administrative burden that a 
transfer might impose on the venue named in the forum-selection clause. 
The opportunities for district courts to characterize this one 
remaining area for analysis as “exceptional” seem dim. Take a moment 
to consider what a strong statement the Atlantic Marine opinion makes 
about the other public interest factor, choice-of-law problems. The sin of 
“flout[ing]” a forum-selection clause is apparently so terrible that the 
plaintiff is made to experience the consequences of filing a lawsuit in an 
improper venue,133 even though the entirety of Part II of the Atlantic 
Marine opinion is organized around the idea that the transferor court is a 
proper venue, making § 1404(a) the appropriate mechanism for 
enforcement. Even the Ferenses were not made to suffer this fate—
plaintiffs infamous for filling in Mississippi for the sole purpose of picking 
up its choice-of-law rules and subsequently returning, via § 1404(a) transfer, 
to their home state of Pennsylvania with a better statute of limitations.134 
If this is the view of the Court with regard to the public interest value of 
minimizing the burdens associated with applying the law of another 
forum, it seems unlikely that the Court would look favorably upon any 
other administrative burdens as “exceptional.” 
Leaving aside the question of whether this is even a good idea for 
§ 1404(a) itself, one is left wondering what this rule might mean for a 
forum non conveniens analysis. Consideration of the law that the 
transferee or foreign forum will need to apply have long been considered 
important aspects of the “public factors” analysis for forum non 
conveniens. This factor has not gone without criticism; consider 
Professor Stein’s admonition that “[t]his has resulted in numerous forum 
non conveniens decisions turning, not on a balance of conveniences, but 
on an informal ‘interest analysis’ that would have done Brainerd Currie 
proud.”135 Despite these problems, acknowledging that a transferee or 
foreign court might have greater facility with the applicable law (or that 
 
 133. Under a § 1406(a) transfer for improper venue, the transferee court does not apply the law of 
the transferor venue. See Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 471–72 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 134. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 528–29 (1990). 
 135. Stein, supra note 13, at 818. 
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the opposite might be true) provides a needed counterweight to some of 
the private factors. It is one way of ensuring that the pure needs and 
conveniences of the parties (and even witnesses) do not overrun other 
considerations in the administration of justice. 
Just as the collapse of the § 1404(a) private factors could signal that 
district courts hearing forum non conveniens motions must also discard 
the private factors, the evisceration of meaningful content from the 
public interest factors does not bode well for an independent forum non 
conveniens analysis. It seems that the conclusion for any district court 
confronted with a forum-selection clause is all but foreordained. 
C. Behold: The Multifactor Test with One Factor, the Balancing 
Test with No Balance, the Discretionary Standard with but 
One Permissible Outcome 
It is here that the Court’s conflation of § 1404(a) and forum non 
conveniens comes into sharp relief. By the time Justice Alito is done with 
the opinion, little is left of anything resembling the old § 1404(a) and 
forum non conveniens doctrines. An explicit prohibition on considering 
the private interest factors is coupled with permission to consider an 
anemic public interest factor that is the least likely to appear 
“exceptional” or “extraordinary.” 
The final nail in the coffin is the Court’s willful ignorance of the word 
“may” in the text of § 1404(a). For, despite Justice Alito’s insistence that 
enforcement of the forum-selection clause is the one and only “interest 
of justice,” the entirety of § 1404(a) is couched in the language of 
discretion. The statute simply lists the terms under which “a district court 
may transfer any civil action.”136 Prior case law and commentary were 
nearly unanimous in agreeing that § 1404(a) conferred a healthy amount 
of discretion on the district judge.137 
In choosing § 1404(a) as the mechanism for enforcement, the Court 
crafted a standard that departs significantly from the standard as it had 
been previously understood. Thus, there is little surprise that the Court 
hardly stopped to consider its language in conflating § 1404(a) and forum 
non conveniens earlier in the opinion. With neither doctrine looking 
much like its usual self, differences and distinctions would have been 
hard to detect. 
It turns out that with respect to forum-selection clause enforcement, 
the “balancing tests” of § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens are a sham, 
a bit of distraction from the main show of applying a substantive contract 
rule that forum-selection clauses are presumptively enforceable under 
 
 136. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 137. See, e.g., 15 Wright et al., supra note 13, § 3847 (summarizing commentary and case law on 
the judicial discretion granted by § 1404(a)). 
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federal law. If both tests are not balancing tests, but merely the vehicles 
for applying this substantive rule, then of course both doctrines will look 
the same. They are both balancing tests in which nothing is being balanced, 
multifactor tests in which the “practical result”138 is that courts may 
consider only one factor, and authorizations of judicial discretion in which 
the district judge has the discretion to come to but one conclusion: enforcing 
the forum-selection clause. 
Perhaps this exposes the weakness that federal enforcement of 
forum-selection clauses has had all along: Without a clear, legislatively 
authorized procedure for enforcement, federal enforcement of a contract 
makes for an awkward Erie fit. Such a legislative fix is not impossible, 
although whether it would be a sound policy decision is different question139 
and one about which I am skeptical. 
In the absence of such a solution, enforcement of forum-selection 
clauses will remain in the wheelhouse of § 1404(a) and forum non 
conveniens. Restoring some measure of balance to each balancing test 
would allow judges to make more nuanced decisions about the enforcement 
of forum-selection clauses. It would also bolster any effort to ensure that 
§ 1404(a) and forum non conveniens remain distinct. 
Conclusion 
Given the implications of Atlantic Marine on the contours of 
§ 1404(a), forum non conveniens, and the substantial expansion of the 
substantive standard for federal enforcement of forum-selection clauses, 
it is puzzling why the Justices were unanimous in joining Justice Alito’s 
opinion. Even if each Justice concurred in the judgment, one wonders 
why there was nary an objection to the Court’s new choice-of-law rule, 
his evisceration of any balance or discretion in the § 1404(a) standard, or 
his carelessness in conflating the distinct doctrines of § 1404(a) and forum 
non conveniens. Perhaps the Justices were lulled by the “straightforward”-
seeming facts of this case, or distracted by the more impressive international 
and constitutional issues in the personal jurisdiction cases. Whatever the 
reasons might be, I would not be surprised if some of the Justices 
experience a bit of buyer’s remorse if it becomes clear that the holding 
and dicta of Atlantic Marine affect far more than just the routine 
enforcement of presumptively valid forum-selection clauses. 
 
 138. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582. 
 139. See generally Mullenix, supra note 22. 
